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INDIANS, RACE, AND CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY
Alex Tallchief Skibine*
Which Sovereign, among the Federal, States, and Indian
nations, has criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country depends on
whether the alleged perpetrator and/or the victim qualify as an
“Indian” for the purposes of certain federal laws.1 Criminal
jurisdiction in Indian Country is mostly determined by four federal
laws, none of which have a specific definition of “Indian.”2 Not only
is there no consensus among the Circuits concerning who qualifies
as an “Indian,”3 but there has recently been a debate among jurists
about whether the classification of “Indian” for the purposes of
these criminal laws amounts to a racial classification calling upon
courts to review such classifications using strict scrutiny.4
When it comes to criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country, some
judges as well as commentators have argued that unless the term
“Indian” is restricted to people who are officially enrolled members
of federally recognized Indian tribes or eligible for such
membership, the classification amounts to a racial classification
and strict scrutiny should be applicable.5 Yet, for years, federal
* S.J. Quinney Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law.
1 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012) (“Indian Country” today is a term of art that includes
all lands within Indian reservations as well as land held in trust or restricted fee
by the United States for the benefit of Indians, and lands set aside by the United
States for Dependent Indian Communities).
2 Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey
Through a Jurisdictional Maze. 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 503 (1976) (On the intricacies of
criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country).
3 See Daniel Donovan & John Rhodes, To Be or Not to Be: Who is an “Indian
Person”?, 73 MONT. L. REV. 61, 66 (2012) (hereinafter, Who is an Indian).
4 See United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir. 2015); United
States v. Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Stymiest,
581 F.3d 759, 764 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1234
(9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 1996); Las
Vegas Tribe of Paiute Indians v. Phebus, 5 F. Supp. 3d 1221, 1231 (D.Nev. 2014).
All recent cases debating the issue.
5 See Quintin Cushner & Jon M. Sands, Blood Should Not Tell: The Outdated
“Blood” Test Used to Determine Indian Status in Federal Criminal Prosecution,
THE FED. LAW., Apr. 2012, at 35 (discussing and agreeing with Judge Rymer’s
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courts have not restricted the term “Indian” to enrolled members
of Indian tribes but have also included persons of Indian ancestry
with substantial ties to Indian communities.6 Many scholars and
commentators have endorsed such a position.7 Although the
United States has treated Indians as belonging to a distinct race
that fact alone does not transform all legislation treating Indians
differently into racial classifications.8 The origin of the debate can
be traced to Morton v. Mancari where the Court ruled that a
federal law giving preference in employment to “Indians” within
the Department of Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs did not
amount to a racial classification because it did not give preferences
to all “Indians” as a race but only to members of Indian tribes with
whom the federal government has a government to government
relationship.9 As such, the classification was political and not
racial. The proper standard of judicial review, therefore, was
rational basis review and not strict scrutiny. As further elaborated
in this Article, the Mancari decision was not pellucid in explaining
the extent and ramifications of its holding.10 Furthermore, its
rationale seemed to contain some contradictions which have fueled
the debate ever since.11
The main question addressed in this Article is whether, because
of either constitutional or policy reasons, the definition of Indians
for the purposes of criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country should
now be construed to only include “enrolled” members of Indian
tribes. In order to discuss this issue, Part I of this paper gives a
brief summary of the laws governing criminal jurisdiction in
dissent in Bruce v. United States, 394 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2005)).
6 See Margo S. Brownell, Who is an Indian? Searching for an Answer to the
Question at the Core of Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 275, 276–
77 (2001).
7 See Addie C. Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari: Indian Political Rights as
Racial Remedy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 995–96 (2011); Brian L. Lewis, Do you
Know What you Are? You are What you is; You is What you am: Indian Status for
the Purpose pf Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and the Current Split in the Courts
of Appeals, 26 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHIC JUST. 241, 244 (2010); Weston Meyring,
“I’m an Indian Outlaw, Half Cherokee and Half Choctaw”: Criminal Jurisdiction
and the Question of Indian Status, 67 MONT. L. REV. 177, 230 (2006).
8 See Sarah Krakoff, Inextricably Political: Race, Membership, and Tribal
Sovereignty, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1041, 1046–47, 1127 (2012); Bethany R. Berger,
Reconciling Equal Protection and Federal Indian Law, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1165, 1170
(2010).
9 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553–54 (1974).
10 See infra notes 92–114.
11 See Carole Goldberg, What’s Race Got to Do with It? The story of Morton v.
Mancari, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 389 (Kevin K. Washburn et al. eds., 2011).
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Indian Country and explains how the courts have interpreted the
term “Indian” for the purposes of these laws. Part II discusses how
the Supreme Court determines whether a classification of “Indian”
amounts to a racial classification, and suggests what test should
be applied to make such determinations. After applying that test
to the definition of “Indian” in federal criminal laws regulating
jurisdiction in Indian Country, Part III discusses what definition
of “Indian” makes the most sense from a policy perspective, taking
into account the current federal policies towards Indian tribes, as
well as the realities of law enforcement in Indian Country.
I. CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY
A. The Statutory Scheme
Although federal criminal laws of general applicability are
generally applicable in Indian Country,12 a few federal criminal
laws are specifically applicable only in Indian Country. The five
major laws are the Indian Country Crimes Act (also known as the
General Crimes Act),13 The (Indian) Major Crimes Act,14 Public
Law 280,15 the statute generally known as the Duro Fix,16 and the
2013 Amendments to the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA).17
The Indian Country Crimes Act (ICCA) has its origins in the
early Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts of the 1790’s and was
amended into its final and current form in 1854.18 It extended the
general criminal laws of the United States over any offense
committed in Indian Country, but contains three exceptions: (1)
crimes committed by Indians against other Indians; (2) crimes
committed by Indians against anyone if such Indian perpetrator
has already been punished under the laws of the tribe; and (3) any
case where by treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over
such offenses has been reserved to the Indian tribe. ICCA is
See United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 896–97 (9th Cir. 1980).
18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012).
14 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012).
15 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2012); 83 Pub. L. No. 280 (1953).
16 Pub. L. No. 101-511, 104 Stat. 1856 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)
(2012)).
17 Pub. L. No. 113-4., 127 Stat. 54 (codified in relevant part at 25 U.S.C. 1304,
and 18 U.S.C. 117(a).
18 Regulation of Trade and Intercourse with Indian Tribes, 1 Stat. 137 (1790).
On the evolution of criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country see, Robert N. Clinton,
Development of Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: The Historical
Perspective, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 951, 955 (1975).
12
13
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generally understood as only affecting “interracial” crimes.19
The Major Crimes Act (MCA) was enacted in 1885 as a reaction
to a Supreme Court decision which held that the federal
government did not have jurisdiction under the Indian Country
Crimes Act to prosecute one Indian for the murder of another
Indian when the crime took place in Indian Country.20 The Indian
Major Crimes Act extended federal criminal jurisdiction over any
Indian who committed any of (originally) seven major crimes
against any other person, Indian or non-Indian.21
Public law 280 was enacted in 1953.22 In provisions relevant to
the subject at hand, the law transferred to designated states the
criminal jurisdiction previously exercised by the federal
government pursuant to the Indian Country Crimes Act and the
Indian Major Crimes Act.23 P.L. 280 did not provide a separate
definition for “Indian.”
In 1991, Congress enacted what is popularly known as the “Duro
Fix” as a response to the Court’s 1990 decision in Duro v. Reina
which held that Indian tribes, by virtue of their status as domestic
dependent nations within the United States, had been implicitly
divested of criminal jurisdiction over Indians who were not
members of the prosecuting tribes.24 The “Duro Fix” reaffirmed
and restored the “inherent power of Indian tribes . . . to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.”25 More important for the
purpose of this Article, the “Duro Fix” defined “Indian” to mean
“any person who would be subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States as an Indian under [the Indian Major Crimes Act] if that
person were to commit an offense listed in that section in Indian
country.”26 The legislative choice made in 1991 to incorporate by
reference the meaning of “Indian” from a previous law which itself
Indian Country Crimes Act (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012)).
See Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 557, 572 (1883).
21 See generally, Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law & Tribal SelfDetermination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 824 (2006).
22 Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 67, Stat. 588, (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1162 (2012), 25 U.S.C. § 1321-26 (2012)).
23 83 PUB. L. NO. 280, supra note 15 (this regulation did not transfer to the
states the criminal jurisdiction exercised by the federal government pursuant to
criminal laws of general applicability). It also did not confer any civil regulatory
authority to the states. See generally, DUANE CHAMPAGNE & CAROLE GOLDBERG,
CAPTURED JUSTICE: NATIVE NATIONS AND PUBLIC LAW 280 (2012).
24 See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990) (The Court had previously ruled
that Indian tribes did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians). But see
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
25 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2016).
26 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (2016).
19
20
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did not define the term was puzzling, to say the least, and invited
litigation over that issue. For instance in In Re: Duane Gervais, 27
a federal district court held that the petitioner/defendant was not
an Indian for the purpose of the Duro fix, and therefore, the tribe
did not have criminal jurisdiction over him. At least one scholar
has advocated that the definition of “Indian” for the purposes of
the Duro fix should be different than it is for the purposes of the
ICCA and MCA.28
Finally, in 2013, Congress amended the Violence Against
Women Act to restore tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians who
commit crimes of domestic violence against tribal Indians while in
Indian Country. Just as in the Duro fix, the Amendments did not
provide a new definition of “Indian.”29
Although there are no substantive differences concerning who
qualifies as an Indian under ICCA or the IMCA, there are
procedural differences. In a typical ICCA prosecution, the
defendant can either be an Indian accused of committing a crime
against a non-Indian or a non-Indian accused of having committed
a crime against an Indian. Defendants in both situations have the
initial duty to raise their status, or the one of their victims (as an
Indian or a non-Indian), as an affirmative defense to the federal
prosecution, and carry the initial burden of production for that
issue by a preponderance of the evidence. The burden then shifts
to the government to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable
doubt. In a prosecution under the Indian Major Crimes Act, the
defendant’s Indian status is an essential element of the
government’s case which the government must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt.30
B. THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW ADDITIONS
In addition to denying tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-

In re Garvais, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1226 (2004).
See Addie C. Rolnick, Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction Beyond Citizenship and
Blood, 39 AM. IND. L. REV. 337 (2016) (recommending that tribal criminal
jurisdiction should be determined by a Community Recognition Standard,
meaning anyone who is recognized by the Tribe as a member of the community)
(hereinafter Rolnick, Beyond Citizenship and Blood).
29 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, 127 Stat. at 121-22
(codified at 25 U.S.C. section 1304).
30 See United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103, 1114 (9th Cir. 2015).
27
28
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Indians31 and non-member Indians,32 the Supreme Court also
made an important federal common law ruling concerning state
jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians against other
non-Indians. In United States v. McBratney33 the Court held that
upon being granted statehood, the state of Colorado obtained
criminal jurisdiction over its own citizens throughout the whole
State. Therefore, it had jurisdiction over crimes committed by nonIndians against other non-Indians in Indian Country. After first
stating that the Act which granted statehood to Colorado
necessarily repealed any existing treaty inconsistent with it,34 the
Court reasoned that, “whenever, upon the admission of a State into
the Union, Congress has intended to except out of it an Indian
reservation, or the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over that
reservation, it has done so by express words.”35 Furthermore, the
Court used the equal footing doctrine, which guarantees admission
of new states on an equal footing with the original states, to
conclude that Colorado “has acquired criminal jurisdiction over its
own citizens and other white persons throughout the whole of the
territory within its limits.”36
The Court never explained why Indian treaties were
inconsistent with the Colorado Statehood Act.37 Furthermore, the
cases cited as precedents for its statement that whenever it wanted
to reserve exclusive jurisdiction over an Indian reservation,
Congress in the past had used express words, do not stand for this
principle.38 One can even question the continuing validity of the
decision after later decisions specifically rejected reliance on the
Equal Footing doctrine to abrogate tribal rights.39
Although it is too late in the day for the Court to reverse this
135 year old flawed reasoning, McBratney has a meaningful
impact today if one decides to limit the definition of “Indian” to
people who are enrolled tribal members or eligible for enrollment.
That is because under that narrower definition of “Indian,” all
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990) (legislatively overturned by the
Duro Fix, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (2016)).
33 United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881).
34 Id. at 623.
35 Id. at 623–24.
36 Id. at 624.
37 Id. at 623.
38 Kan. Indians, 72 U.S. 737, 756 (1866); United States v. Ward, 28 F. Cas.
397, 398 (1863).
39 See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 382–83 (1905); Minnesota v.
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 206 (1999).
31
32
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crimes committed by non-enrolled “Indians” against non-Indians
or other non-enrolled Indians would transfer to state jurisdiction
since they would become crimes by non-Indians against other nonIndians.
C. The Case Law Defining Who is an “Indian” Under the
Federal Criminal Jurisdiction Statutes
1. The Rogers Test
The current test adopted by most courts today to determine who
qualifies as an Indian for the purpose of criminal jurisdiction in
Indian Country is frequently referred to as the Rogers test because
it originated with the 1845 Supreme Court decision of United
States v. Rogers.40 The case involved the federal prosecution of
Rogers, a white man accused of having killed another person
within Cherokee territory. Rogers argued that he had become a
citizen of the Cherokee Nation and, therefore, the federal
government had no jurisdiction over him since the prosecution was
brought under a statute which was a precursor to the ICCA and
contained the same exemption for Indians committing crimes
against other Indians.41 The Supreme Court disagreed, stating:
We think it [is] very clear, that a white man who at
mature age is adopted in an Indian tribe does not
thereby become an Indian, and was not intended to
be embraced in the exception . . . The exception is
confined to those who by the usages and customs of
the Indians are regarded as belonging to their race.
[The exception] does not speak of members of a tribe,
but of the race generally,-- of the family of Indians.42
Although this language can arguably be read as reserving to the
tribes the decision of who, under “the usage and customs of the
Indians,” should be regarded as racially an Indian, this has not
been the courts’ interpretation.43
United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 572–73 (1845).
Id. at 572 (interestingly, the victim was also a white man that had become
a citizen of the Cherokee Nation).
42 Id. at 572–73.
43 But see Addie C. Rolnick, Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction Beyond Citizenship
and Blood, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 337, 375 (2016) (arguing that tribes should
40
41
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Although in the wake of Rogers, many courts struggled with
determining whether half-blood Indians qualified as Indians.44 By
1979, the Ninth Circuit had settled on a two prong test, stating
“The test, first suggested in United States v. Rogers and generally
followed by the courts, considers (1) the degree of Indian blood; and
(2) Tribal or governmental recognition as an Indian.”45 In United
States v. Bruce,46 the Ninth Circuit refined the second prong of the
Rogers test. Bruce involved an ICCA prosecution where the
defendant was arguing that because she was an Indian who had
committed a crime against another Indian, she should have been
prosecuted under the MCA and not the ICCA.
The Court endorsed a four factor test to determine if the person
should be recognized as an Indian. The four factors are: 1. Tribal
enrollment; 2. Government recognition through receipt of
assistance reserved only to Indians; 3. Enjoyment of the benefits of
tribal affiliation; and 4. Social recognition as an Indian through
residence on a reservation and participation in Indian social life.47
The Ninth Circuit further clarified the meaning of the four Bruce
factors in United States v. Cruz.48 Cruz was prosecuted as an
Indian under the MCA but he challenged his status as an Indian.
The majority held that the government had not met its burden to
show that Cruz was an Indian because although Cruz had enough
Indian blood to meet the first prong of the test, he did not meet any
of the four factors in the second prong. The Court first confirmed
decide who is an Indian within their community, at least for the purpose of the
Duro Fix).
44 See Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 501 (1896) (i.e. The Court held
that the illegitimate child of a full blood Indian and a black man could not be
classified as an Indian).
45 United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1262 (9th Cir. 1979).
46 United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1224 (9th Cir. 2005).
47 Id. at 1223. The four factor test endorsed by Bruce had been essentially
formulated in an earlier case by a federal district court in St. Cloud v. United
States, 702 F. Supp. 1456 (D.S.D. 1988). After specifying that “The second prong
of the Rogers test in essence probes whether the Native American has a sufficient
non-racial link to a formerly sovereign people,” the St. Cloud court enumerated
the four factors adopted later by the Bruce court. St. Cloud v. United States, 702
F. Supp. 1456, 1461 (D.S.D. 1988). The St. Cloud court also added that “These
factors do not establish a precise formula for determining who is an Indian.
Rather, they merely guide the analysis of whether a person is recognized as an
Indian.” Id. Although the court found that even though St. Cloud did not meet
the first two factors, he would normally be classified as an Indian because he met
the last two factors, St. Cloud could not meet the test because he had been
enrolled with a tribe which was officially terminated by the federal government.
Id. at 1465.
48 United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2009).
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that the Bruce factors were to be considered in descending order of
importance.49 The fact that he was recognized as the descendant
of a tribal member and was, as such, eligible for some federal and
tribal benefits was not enough to make him an “Indian” because he
never took advantage of any of those benefits.50 In addition, even
though he had lived on the reservation when he was younger, had
recently returned and had been prosecuted in tribal Court, he
never considered himself an Indian or related to others socially as
an Indian by participating in the tribe’s cultural life and
ceremonies.51
Chief Judge Kozinsky authored a dissent which strongly
disagreed that the Bruce factors had to be considered in declining
order of importance.52 He also took the position that whether one
actually took advantage of federal and tribal benefits available to
Indians was irrelevant. What was important was that one was
judged eligible for such benefits by federal or tribal authorities.53
Finally, Judge Kozinski did not agree with the majority that
whether one considers oneself an Indian is an important factor.
More recently, the 9th Circuit added some modifications to the
Bruce four factor test in the en banc decision in United States v.
Zepeda.54 The Ninth Circuit first clarified that the accused must
have a current relationship with a federally recognized tribe and
that the tribe was federally recognized at the time of the offense.55
Furthermore, as stated in a recent federal district court decision,
Zepeda altered the language of the second factor of
the Bruce test and clarified that the factor focuses
on whether the individual received assistance
reserved only for tribal members or those eligible to
become members. This alteration is not trivial as
the original language from Bruce tested whether the
individual received assistance ‘reserved only to
Indians[.]’56
As some commentators have noted, other Circuits have adopted
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Id. at 846.
Id. at 849–50.
Id. at 848.
Id. at 852.
Id.
United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103, 1113 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
Id. at 1113–14.
United States v. Loera, 190 F. Supp. 3d 873, 882 (2016).
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different tests to measure Rogers’ Second Prong.57 A good example
of a slightly different approach is the Eighth Circuit’s decision in
United States v. Stymiest.58 In that case, the government had
indicted Stymiest under the Indian Major Crimes Act but Stymiest
argued that he was not an Indian. The Eighth Circuit first
confirmed that although the Indian status of the defendant or the
victim was essential to federal subject matter jurisdiction, it was
not a jurisdictional issue to be decided by the court as a matter of
law. Instead, it was an element of the crime that must be
submitted and decided by a jury. The Eighth Circuit went on to
adopt its own version for evaluating Rogers’ Second Prong, one
where the Bruce factors are neither exhaustive, “[n]or should they
be tied to an order of importance, unless the defendant is an
enrolled tribal member, in which case that factor becomes
dispositive.”59 In addition, the Stymiest Court held that two factors
not listed by the Bruce court, whether the defendant identified
himself as an Indian, and whether he subjected himself to the
jurisdiction of the tribal court, were in fact relevant to the overall
inquiry.60
2. Issues with the Blood Quantum Prong
Under the Rogers test, one cannot be an “Indian” without
possessing some quantum of Indian blood although the courts have
never formalized how much Indian blood was enough Indian
blood.61 Although as late as 1968, some cases spoke of “substantial
percentage of Indian blood,”62 and later cases seemed to have
57 See Katharine C. Oakley, Defining Indian Status for the Purpose of Federal
Criminal Jurisdiction, 35 AM. INDIAN. L. REV. 177 (2010-2011) (describing all the
various approaches which have been or might be taken by courts and arguing for
a single uniform approach for the sake of consistency and clarity). See also
Donovan & Rhodes, Who is an Indian, supra note 3 (explaining the difference in
approaches between the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits).
58 United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 2009).
59 Id. at 764.
60 Id. at 763–64. (The Eight Circuit also made the interesting observation that
it was troubled by the possibility that under the jury instruction given by the
district judge, a jury could find someone to be an Indian without finding that such
a person was “recognized as an Indian by the tribe or the federal government.”
However, since no one had raised any objection, the court concluded that the jury
instruction was not an abuse of discretion by the district court judge.).
61 See United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1227 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding the
defendant had 1/8th quantum of Indian blood and that was held to be enough to
meet the first part of the test).
62 See Makah Indian Tribe v. Clallam County, 440 P.2d 442, 444 (1968)

2017]

INDIANS, RACE, AND CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

59

lowered the necessary amount to 1/8th quantum of Indian blood
and perhaps lower.63 A further complication concerns the kind of
“Indian” blood that qualifies for the purposes of the test. As stated
in Bruce, “the first prong requires ancestry living in America before
the Europeans arrived.”64 One could surmise that by “America” the
Bruce court meant the United States of America, but the meaning
is far from clear. In one case, a state court found that a person of
Canadian Indian heritage met the first prong of the Rogers test.65
But if Canadian Indian blood qualifies, why not Indian blood from
tribes aboriginal to Mexico? And if so, how about South and
Central America? It seems that for this purpose, the universe of
Indian tribes from which Indian blood can be derived should be
limited to tribes that are aboriginal to the United States. But what
about blood from tribes originating in the United States which no
longer exist, have been terminated, or were never recognized by
the federal government?
This question provided a spirited debate in a recent Ninth
Circuit en banc decision: United States v. Zepeda.66 At issue in that
case was whether the government had met its burden under the
Indian Major Crimes Act to show that the defendant, Zepeda, had
“Indian blood.” The more recent precedent before Zepeda was
United States v. Maggi,67 where a panel of the Ninth Circuit held
that the quantum of Indian blood must be traceable to a federally
recognized Indian tribe.68 In its en banc opinion, the Ninth Circuit
overruled Maggi and concluded that the “blood” could come from
any Indian tribe, recognized or not.
The Court rejected the argument that allowing blood quantum
from a non-federally recognized tribe would make federal
jurisdiction depend upon a racial rather than a political
classification.69 Even if it did, the court concluded that the second
prong of the Bruce/Rogers test which requires some kind of
(Describing the first prong as requiring “a substantial percentage of Indian
blood.“).
63 See Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1227. See also Weston Meyring, “I’m an Indian
Outlaw, Half Cherokee and Choctaw”: Criminal Jurisdiction and the Question of
Indian Status, 67 MONT. L. REV. 177, 202 (2006) (while cases have not been
entirely consistent, no cases has held that one could qualify as an Indian with less
than 1/16th Indian blood quantum).
64 Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1223.
65 State v. Daniels, 16 P.3d 650, 654 (2001).
66 United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2015).
67 United States v. Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2010).
68 Id. at 1080–81.
69 Zepeda, 792 F.3d at 1111.
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recognition as an Indian by, or affiliation with, a federally
recognized Indian tribe, “is enough to ensure that Indian status is
not a racial classification.”70 Furthermore, noting that the Court
in Morton v. Mancari had upheld a law which specified that in
order to take advantage of the law in question, “an Indian must be
one-fourth or more degree Indian blood and be a member of a
Federally-recognized tribe,”71 the Zepeda court majority held that
the blood quantum prong of the test did not transform the
definition of “Indian” into a racial classification.72 Judges Kozinski
and Ikuta issued vehement dissenting opinions.73
Judge Kozinski took issue with the first prong of the Rogers test
and even more with the majority’s holding that the Indian blood
quantum needed to satisfy the first prong does not have to come
from a federally recognized Indian tribe.74 According to him,
overruling Maggi and allowing the necessary blood quantum to
come from a non-federally recognized tribe made the Rogers test
even worse because “Maggi at least tied the racial component in
Bruce to a political relationship.”75 Answering the majority’s
reliance on the second prong of the Rogers test to salvage its
interpretation of the first prong, Judge Kozinski stated “[T]he
presence of a separate and independent ‘non-racial prong’ cannot
save a test that otherwise turns on race.”76
For Judge Kozinski, it was problematic that some tribal
members who satisfied the second prong of the Rogers test could
still not be subject to the Major Crimes Act if those members failed
the first prong in that they were not racially “Indian enough.”77 In
other words, the law would allow Congress to “treat identically
situated individuals within a tribe differently from one another
based on their immutable racial characteristics.”78 Judge Ikuta
joined Judge Kozinski in dissent and also added that the first
prong of the Rogers test “disrespect tribal sovereignty by refusing
to defer to the tribe’s own determination of its membership roll.

Id.
Id. at 1112 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553, n. 24 (1974)).
72 Id. at 1112 (quoting United v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977)).
73 Id. at 1116–20, (Kozinski, J. & Ikuta, J., dissenting).
74 Id. at 1116.
75 Zepada, 792 F.3d at 1118.
76 Id. at 1117.
77 Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“But not all tribe members are subject to the
IMCA. Separating those who are from those who are not is the function of Bruce’s
first requirement, and that requirement turns entirely on race.”).
78 Id. at 1116.
70
71
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It’s as if we declined to deem a person to be a citizen of France
unless that person can prove up a certain quantum of “French
blood.”79
The dissent acknowledged that one Supreme Court precedent,
United States v. Rogers, created the blood quantum part of the test
but stated that “Reliance on pre-civil war precedent laden with
dubious racial undertones seems an odd course for our circuit law
to have followed.”80 Judge Kozinski also thought that Rogers could
easily be distinguished as a case which just did not allow a white
man to claim citizenship in an Indian tribe later in life in order to
avoid federal prosecution for murder.81 Concerning the majority’s
reliance that the law at issue in Mancari had a blood quantum,
Judge Kozinski just mentioned that “that portion of the provision
in Mancari wasn’t challenged by plaintiffs, nor was there any
assertion that the hiring preference in that case discriminated
among tribe members.82
The majority argued that it was rational to allow the blood
quantum to come from any Indian tribe, recognized or not, because
otherwise it would be problematic for the federal government to
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the required blood
quantum comes from federally recognized tribes.83 I am not so sure
that difficulty in proving something for the purpose of federal
prosecution is enough of a reason to impose what seems to be an
irrational and arbitrary requirement. If genetic affiliation with a
non-recognized tribe is sufficient, would one have to define the
universe of “non-recognized” tribes? Would genetic affiliation with
a Canadian or Mexican Indian tribe qualify? But if this is so,
would it not indicate that the first prong of the Rogers test is really
about making sure the person if of the Indian race? Would this not
then highlight that “racial” aspect of the classification?
Scholars and commentators have also criticized continuing
adherence to the Rogers decision,84 and continued adherence to it.85
Id. at 1119.
Id. at 1118. (J. Kozinski dissenting) (Referring to language in Rogers to the
effect that the government had to exercise power over this “unfortunate race” in
order “to enlighten their minds . . . and to save them if possible from the
consequences of their own vices.”).
81 Zepada, 792 F.3d at 1118.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 1114–15.
84 Berger, supra note 8, at 2041.
85 See Cushner & Sands, supra note 5, at 35 (stating “We believe that the two
pronged Rogers test . . . should be replaced by the simple requirement that a
defendant be eligible for enrollment with the relevant federally recognized tribe.”
79
80
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Although the Rogers decision may have adequately reflected the
political leanings and feelings of the times during which it was
decided, discarding the decision today would not have any major
practical impacts. To start with, discarding the first prong of the
test would avoid the awkward possibility raised by Judge Kozinski
that an enrolled member from a tribe with no minimum blood
quantum requirement would be found not to have “enough” Indian
blood to meet the first prong of the test.86 Secondly, because all
Indian tribes do require their members to have some kind of Indian
ancestry, the amount of people who can satisfy the second
(recognition) prong of the test while having no Indian blood at all
is likely to be infinitesimally small.87 Third, getting rid of the first
prong would eliminate the thorny debate, as highlighted in
Zepeda, about whether the Indian “blood” has to be traced to a
federally recognized tribe.
Finally, it should put to rest any discussion whether the
classification is based on race.88
3. Issues surrounding the Political Recognition Prong
The second prong allows a person with enough Indian blood to
qualify as an “Indian” as long as that person is recognized,
politically or socially, as an Indian, by either the federal
government, a federally recognized tribal government, or even a
recognized Indian community.89 More importantly, the second
prong allows someone to qualify as an Indian without being
officially enrolled or eligible for enrollment in any federally
recognized Indian tribe. As stated by the Ninth Circuit:
[A]lthough an allegation of enrollment may be
sufficient for purposes of alleging federal
(arguing that treating individual Indians as belonging to a (inferior) race rather
than as citizens of Indian nations was crucial to aggrandizing the power of
Congress over Indian affairs)).
86 See United States v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277, 1282–83 (10th Cir. 2001)
(membership in Tesuque Pueblo is not enough to satisfy Roger’s first prong absent
evidence that Indian blood was one of the requirements for membership).
87 Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN
AFFAIRS, http://www.bia.gov/FAQs/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2017).
88 But see Jacqueline F. Langland, Indian Status Under the Major Crimes Act,
15 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 109, 131 (2012) (arguing that relying on tribal
membership in defining who is an Indian amounts to a racial classification since
Tribes require Indian blood to be members).
89 United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 2015).
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jurisdiction, . . . enrollment has not yet been held to
be an absolute requirement of federal jurisdiction . . .
Nor should it be. Enrollment is the common
evidentiary means of establishing Indian status, but
it is not the only means nor is it necessarily
determinative.90
The question here is whether there are any justifications today
for not limiting the second prong to enrolled tribal members.
Searching the older cases in the wake of Rogers, it seems that
jurisdiction was extended to un-enrolled Indians because of
essentially two factors. First, it is not until the end of the 19th
Century that the idea of having formal tribal membership rolls
came into existence.91 The very idea of “enrollment through
membership rolls” is not part of tribal traditional practices.92
Secondly, even though some early tribal membership rolls may
have existed by 1885 when the Indian Major Crimes Act was
enacted, these “rolls” and all enrollment procedures were created
and maintained by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and not
Indian tribes. Courts became aware that for one reason or another,
BIA officials did not place all Indians living on the reservations on
official tribal rolls. In Ex Parte Pero v. Pero for instance,93 after
examining cases where Indians were judicially determined to be
Indians even though not present on any tribal membership rolls,94
the court stated “[T]he refusal of the Department of Interior to
enroll a certain Indian as a member of a certain tribe is not
necessarily an administrative determination that the person is not
an Indian.”95
Although the decision to include in the universe of “Indian” to
persons not listed on tribal rolls was initially made out of necessity
and for pragmatic reasons, today we are in an era where the tribes
90 United States v. Walter Dale Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1262–63 (4th Cir.
1979).
91 See Gabriel S. Galanda & Ryan D. Dreveskracht, Curing the Tribal
Disenrollment Epidemic: In Search of a Remedy, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 383, 393–408
(2015) (describing how and when the concept of “tribal membership” came into
being).
92 See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Of Native Americans and Tribal Members:
The Impact of Law on Indian Group Life, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1123, 1127 (1994).
93 See Ex Parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 30–33 (7th Cir. 1938).
94 See generally Vezina v. United States, 245 F. 411 (8th Cir. 1917); Sully v.
United States, 195 F. 113 (C.C.D.S.D. 1912); United States v. Higgins, 103 F. 348,
348 (C.C.D. Mont. 1900); Doe ex dem. Lafontaine v. Avaline, 8 Ind. 6 (1856).
95 Ex Parte Pero, 99 F.2d at 31.
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themselves have comprehensively taken over the process of
maintaining and updating their tribal membership rolls. The
question is whether there are any legal or policy reasons to change
the test and limit the term “Indian” to enrolled tribal members. As
one federal magistrate once stated:
As a practical matter, in light of the Indians’
protected status under federal law, the
government’s treaty obligations, and as a matter of
comity to the tribal courts, and as a rational
interpretation of the accepted precepts governing
tribal sovereignty over tribal members and crimes
committed against tribal members on Indian
reservations by those acknowledged to be of Indian
ancestry, the Court concludes that in using the term
“Indian” in section 1152 Congress intended it to
mean an Indian who is an enrolled member of a
federally-recognized tribe.96
Legally, the question is whether constitutional concerns require
the term “Indian” to be limited to enrolled tribal members. If the
answer is no, the next question is whether the purposes and
policies of the federal criminal statutes, as well as current federal
policies concerning Indian affairs, would be served by retaining an
expanded universe of “Indian” beyond formal enrollment in a tribe.
The constitutional issue will be discussed in Part II, the policy one
in Part III.
II. THE EQUAL PROTECTION ISSUE
The late Judge Rymer filed a strong dissent in Bruce arguing,
among other things, that language used by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Antelope,97 should compel lower courts to modify
Rogers’ second prong because “enrollment-or at a minimum,
eligibility for enrollment-may be constitutionally required to avoid
equal protection problems because otherwise, enforcement of
federal criminal laws would arguably be based on an
impermissible racial classification.”98 The Court in Antelope had
United States v. Loera, 952 F. Supp. 2d 862, 879 (D. Ariz. 2013).
United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1234 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing United
States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977)).
98 Id. at 1233–34.
96
97
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stated:
[F]ederal regulation of Indian affairs is not based
upon impermissible classifications. Rather, such
regulation is rooted in the unique status of Indians
as “a separate people” . . . Federal regulation of
Indian tribes, therefore, is governance of oncesovereign political communities; it is not to be
viewed as legislation of a “ ‘racial’ group consisting
of ‘Indians’. . . .” Indeed, respondents were not
subjected to federal criminal jurisdiction because
they are of the Indian race but because they are
enrolled members of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe.99
The Bruce majority never answered Judge Rymer’s Equal
Protection arguments, stating basically that until such time as
they are modified or overruled by an en banc Ninth Circuit opinion,
it had to follow circuit precedents which had held that enrollment
in a federally recognized Indian tribe was not an absolute
requirement.100 It also has to be noted that in a footnote, the
Antelope Court acknowledged that “enrollment in an official tribe
has not been held to be an absolute requirement for federal
jurisdiction, at least where the Indian defendant lived on the
reservation and ‘maintained tribal relations with the Indians
thereon.’”101 Because the Indians in the Antelope case were
enrolled, however, the Court stated that it did not have to intimate
any view on whether unenrolled Indians could be subject to the
Major Crimes Act.102
A. The Jurisprudence of Mancari
As mentioned earlier, the Court in Morton v. Mancari upheld
the constitutionality of a statute granting preference in
employment to Indians within the Bureau of Indian Affairs.103
Non-Indian federal employees had argued that the preference
United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977).
Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1224–25 (relying on United States v. Walter Dale
Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d
758, 761 (9th Cir. 2005)).
101 Antelope, 430 U.S. at n.7.
102 Id. at n.7.
103 See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 535 (1974).
99

100
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amounted to racial discrimination and should be reviewed under
strict scrutiny.104 The Court first mentioned that “resolution of the
instant issue turns on the unique legal status of Indian tribes
under federal law and upon the plenary power of Congress, based
on a history of treaties and the assumption of a ‘guardian–ward’
status, to legislate on behalf of federally recognized Indian
tribes.”105 After stating that “The plenary power of Congress to
deal with the special problems of Indians is drawn both explicitly
and implicitly from the Constitution. . . .”106 the Court mentioned
the treaty power and the power to regulate Commerce with the
Indian tribes as the source of the Government’s power to deal with
Indian tribes.107 More notably, the Court stated that the Indian
Commerce power “singles Indians out as a proper subject for
separate legislation.”108
After mentioning that if laws specifically addressing the
concerns of Indians were deemed to be invidious racial
classification, literally “an entire Title of the United States Code
would be effectively erased. . . .”109 the Court took the position that
the preference “does not constitute ‘racial discrimination.’ Indeed
it is not even ‘racial’ preference,”110 because “[t]he preference, as
applied, is granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but,
rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities.”111 In a
footnote, the Court emphasized that because the preference only
applied to tribal members and therefore operated to exclude many
individuals who were racially Indians but not tribal members, the
preference was “political rather than racial in nature.”112 The
Court ended up by concluding that “[a]s long as the special
treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’
unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments
will not be disturbed.”113 While there are some who thought that
Id. at 537.
Id. at 551.
106 Id. at 551–52.
107 Id. at 552.
108 Id. (Article I. Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution States
“The Congress shall have the power to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”).
109 Morton, 417 U.S. at 552.
110 Id. at 553.
111 Id. at 554.
112 Id. at n.24.
113 Id. at 555. (“Here, where the preference is reasonably and rationally
designed to further Indian self-government, we cannot say that Congress’
classification violates due process.”).
104
105
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the Court may have been announcing a higher level of rational
basis scrutiny in this sentence,114 this did not turn out to be the
case.115
Since Mancari, the Court has evaluated special classification for
Native Americans four other times and each time upheld the
classification as not being racial but political.116 The more
important case for the purpose of this Article is United States v.
Antelope117 where Indians challenged a law that subjected them to
a federal criminal law containing a felony murder provision which
was not applicable to similar crimes committed by non-Indians and
prosecuted under state law.
The Court noted that, unlike Mancari, this law was not
promoting tribal self-government but was “dealing, not with
matters of self-regulation, but with federal regulation of criminal
conduct within Indian country.”118 Yet, the Court concluded that
the law was not based upon impermissible racial classifications
because Federal regulation of Indian tribes is “rooted in the unique
status of Indians as ‘separate people’” . . . it is “governance of oncesovereign political communities; it is not to be viewed as legislation
of a ‘racial’ group consisting of Indians.”119 Absent from the opinion
was any reference to the trust responsibility or whether the law
was rationally tied to Congress’s unique obligations towards

114 See Ralph Johnson & E. Susan Crystal, Indians and Equal Protection, 54
WASH. L. REV. 587 (1979).
115 See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977). The Court applied
traditional rational basis review and stated “respondents do not seriously contend
that application of federal law to Indian tribes is so irrational as to deny equal
protection.” Id. at 647, n.8.
116 See, e.g., Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976). The Court held that
a law denying Indians access to state courts did not amount to racial
discrimination because “[t]he exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribal Court does not
derive from the race of the plaintiff but from the quasi-sovereign status of the
Northern Cheyenne Tribe.” Id. at 390. In the next case, Delaware Tribal
Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977), The Court upheld the
distribution of a Court of Claims award that had omitted a class of tribal
descendants. Finally, in Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima
Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979), The Court upheld against a due process and
equal protection challenge, a federal law (P.L. 280) which granted criminal
jurisdiction over some Indian reservations to the state of Washington. The Court
stated “It is [well] settled that ‘the unique legal status of Indian tribes under
federal law’ permits the Federal Government to enact legislation singling out
tribal Indians, legislation that might otherwise be constitutionally offensive.” Id.
at 500–01.
117 Antelope, 430 U.S. at 643–44.
118 Id. at 646.
119 Id.
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Indians. Instead, the Court affirmed that laws treating Indians
differently cannot be considered racial classifications a long as
they involve the governance of Indian tribes. In other words, as
long as the laws are enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce
clause or to implement and enforce treaties.
One case, Rice v. Cayetano,120 refused to apply Morton v.
Mancari’s political classification, but the challenge was to a state
law which restricted voting for selection of trustees to the State’s
Office of Hawaiian Affairs to Native Hawaiians. Even though the
definition of Native Hawaiian was expanded to include all persons
who had an ancestor living on the Islands before the arrival of the
first European in 1778, the Court held that the voting restrictions
were unconstitutional under the 15th Amendment to the United
States Constitution because “[a]ncestry can be a proxy for race. It
is that proxy here.”121 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy
distinguished Mancari and mentioned that the reason tribal
elections established under federal statutes can restrict non-tribal
members from voting was because these were elections for the
internal governance of quasi sovereign tribes while this case
involved elections to a state office.122
Interestingly enough, four Justices took the position that if the
statute containing the classification of Native Hawaiians was
enacted pursuant to a trust responsibility, the classification could
not be considered racial. Two of these Justices, Breyer and Souter,
took the position that there was no federal trust relationship with
Native Hawaiians and that Native Hawaiians did not “sufficiently
resemble an Indian tribe.”123 The two other Justices, Stevens and
Ginsburg, believed that “the grounds for recognizing the existence
of federal trust power here are overwhelming.”124
In the lower courts, the debate surrounding when a law with a
specific “Indian classification” may amount to a racial
classification has depended on whether the law was enacted

Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 542 (2000).
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, or previous condition of servitude.”); Cayetano, 528 U.S. at 495.
122 Cayetano, 528 U.S at 520–21.
123 Id. at 525 (Breyer, J., concurring).
124 Id. at 532, 534 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The descendants of the Native
Hawaiians share with the descendants of the Native Americans . . . not only a
history of subjugation at the hands of colonial forces, but also a purposefully
created and specialized ‘guardian-ward’ relationship with the United States.”).
120
121
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pursuant to the Indian trust doctrine,125 the Indian Commerce
clause,126 or affected “uniquely Indian interests.”127 Concerning
this last one, Judge Kozinski stated:
legislation that relates to Indian land, tribal status,
self-government, or culture, passes Mancari’s
rational relation test because ‘such regulation is
rooted in the unique status of Indians as a “separate
people” with their own political institutions’ . . . ‘as
a separate people’, Indians have a right to expect
some special protection for their land, political
institutions . . . and culture.128
As further explained in the next section, this Article takes the
position that attempting to decide what interests are “uniquely
Indian” is taking courts into unchartered territory and ultimately
is not a proper judicial task.
B. Distinguishing Between Racial and Political Classifications
The difficult question in the wake of Mancari has been to
determine which legislative classifications of Indians are political
in nature and which ones are racial and therefore subject to strict
scrutiny.129 In light of these difficulties, some scholars have
criticized the dichotomy first established in Mancari, and some

125 Alaska Chapter v. Pierce, 694 F.2d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 1982) (“If the
preference in fact furthers Congress’s special obligations, then a fortiori it is a
political rather than racial classification even though racial criteria might be used
in defining who is an eligible Indian.”).
126 See Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emp. v. United States, 330 F.3d 513, 521–22 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (upholding a tribal exception for tribally owned defense contractors).
The critical consideration is Congress’ power to regulate
commerce ‘with the Indian Tribes’ . . . [R]egulation of commerce
with tribes is at the heart of the Clause, particularly when the
tribal commerce is with the federal government, as it is here.
When Congress exercises this constitutional power it
necessarily must engage in classifications that deal with Indian
tribes. Id.
127 See Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 1997).
128 Id. at 664 (quoting United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977)).
129 See Gregory Smith & Caroline Mayhew, Apocalypse Now: The Unrelenting
Assault on Morton v. Mancari, THE FED. LAW., April 2013, at 48 (commentators
have noted the many challenges levelled at Mancari’s political v. racial
classification dichotomy).

70

ALBANY GOVERNMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10

have even argued for its abandonment. 130 More recently, Professor
Sarah Krakoff has suggested that although legislation singling out
Indians and Indian tribes have an “obvious” racial component, this
does not make such legislation constitutionally suspect on account
of race. According to Professor Krakoff, the racial component in
Indian legislation comes from the fact that Congress under the
Constitution can only establish government to government
relationships with groups internal to the United States if the
members of this group can establish some ancestral ties or lineage
to indigenous people, meaning people or groups who were in
existence before the Europeans arrived to America.131
This Article does not go as far as advocating the abandonment
of the Mancari dichotomy. Instead, this Article takes the position
that any legislation enacted pursuant to Congress’s Indian
Commerce power cannot be considered “racial” because Indians
are singled out for special treatment in that Constitutional
clause.132 Although some have argued that the 14th Amendment
was enacted after the Commerce Clause, and as such modified its
reach,133 others have noted that Section 2 of the 14th Amendment
does mention “Indians no taxed” as not being eligible to be counted
for the purpose of apportioning congressional seats.134 These
scholars have argued that this language showed that the drafters
of the Amendment did not intend to change previous
understandings concerning the status of Indians or the political
status of tribes within the United States.135
Treating all legislation enacted pursuant to the Indian
Commerce Clause as not racial legislation does generate a concern
130 See Sarah Krakoff, Inextricably Political: Race, Membership, and Tribal
Sovereignty, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1041, 1059 (2012); Robert Clinton, Isolated in their
Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy and SelfGovernment, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979 (1981); Goldberg, supra note 11; Rolnick, supra
note 7; Berger, supra note 7.
131 See Sarah Krakoff, They Were Here First: American Indian Tribes, Race,
and the Constitutional Minimum, 69 STAN. L. REV. 491, 537 (2017).
132 This argument has previously been eloquently made by others, see Carole
Goldberg, American Indians and Preferential Treatment, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1, 25
(2002).
133 See David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection: Indians as
Peoples, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 759 (1991).
134 The first sentence of section 2 of the 14th Amendment reads
“Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State,
excluding the Indians not taxed.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
135 See Clinton, supra note 130, at 1012; Carole Goldberg, Not Strictly Racial:
A Response to “Indians as Peoples”, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 169, 175 (1991).
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because the Court has traditionally refused to place any internal
limit on Congress’s power under the Indian Commerce Clause.136
In the next section, I describe the limits that should be placed on
Congress’s Indian Commerce power.
1. Limits on Congressional Power Pursuant to the
Indian Commerce Clause
The previous generation of pro-tribal scholars were weary of
congressional plenary power being used to control everything
inside Indian reservations, thereby infringing unduly on tribal
sovereignty.137 These scholars argued that there had to be some
limits to what could be considered “commerce” under the Indian
Commerce Clause.138 More recently, states rights scholars have
been leery of Congress using its Indian Commerce Clause power to
regulate Indian related affairs beyond the reservations thereby
interfering with state sovereignty.139 Justice Thomas, for instance,
penned a vigorous concurrence in which he strongly argued that
Congress had no commerce clause power to enact most sections of
the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) because those provisions
involved neither trade nor commerce, nor the regulation of Indian
tribes.140 Concerned that such states’ rights argument may
endanger some pro-tribal legislation such as ICWA, the next
generation of pro-tribal scholars have struck a middle ground,
acknowledging some limits to the power of Congress under the

136 This does not mean, however, that there are no external limits imposed by
other parts of the Constitution. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 718 (1987)
(holding that Congress cannot not take Indian property rights without just
compensation).
137 See Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope,
and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 213 (1984) (“According to the Court,
Indian tribes had limited authority over ’internal and social relations’ because
they were ‘semi-independent.’”); See, e.g., Robert A. Williams, The Algebra of
Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White
Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219, 264–65 (1986).
138 See Robert N. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian
Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 113, 131 (2002).
139 See Robert G. Natelson, The Original Understanding of the Indian
Commerce Clause, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 201 (2007).
140 See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2570 (2013) (Thomas,
J., Concurring) (stating “the portions of the ICWA at issue here do not regulate
Indian tribes as tribes,” since it applied to “all child custody proceedings involving
an Indian child regardless of whether an Indian tribe is involved. This case thus
does not directly implicate Congress’ power to ‘legislate in respect to Indian
tribes.” (quoting United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004))).
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Indian commerce clause while arguing that the power does extend
beyond the regulation of “commercial” affairs and may include the
regulation of all interactions, social or commercial, between the
tribes or their members, and non-Indians.141
Although the Court continues to endorse its 1989 statement that
“the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide
Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian
affairs,”142 more recent scholarship has demonstrated this
statement to be historically inaccurate.
Professor Gregory
Ablavsky, for instance, has argued that the Indian Commerce
power was “a minor component of a broad Indian affairs power
resting on multiple [constitutional] provisions.”143 Accepting
Professor Ablavsky’s findings does not mean that Congress has a
free hand in treating Indians differently for all purposes. It is only
when acting pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause, or the
treaty power, that Congress can classify Indians differently
without such classifications amounting to racial ones. Although
the Indian Commerce Clause power may not give unbridled and
absolute power to Congress, it is still considerable.144 As I have
argued elsewhere, for instance, the Trust Doctrine does not limit
the Indian commerce power to enact Indian legislation just
benefitting tribes. Thus, Congress can at times act as a regulator
(of Indian tribes) and at times as a trustee.145
How far the Indian Commerce Clause power may extend,
especially in areas beyond Indian Country, is a difficult question.146
See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, ICWA and the Commerce Clause, in FACING
FUTURE: THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT AT 30 (Matthew L.M. Fletcher,
Wenona F. Singel & Kathryn R. Fort, eds., 2008).
142 Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989).
143 Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J.
1012, 1050 (2015).
144 See Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2010) (arguing
that the Indian Commerce Clause as interpreted by the first Congress in the early
Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts gave Congress power reaching beyond the
regulation of trade and commercial affairs with Indian nations).
145 See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Indian Gaming and Cooperative Federalism, 42
ARIZ. ST. L. J. 253, 267–69 (2010).
146 See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Tribal Sovereign Interests Beyond the
Reservation, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1003, 1040–41 (2008). See also Monica
Haymond, Who’s in and Who’s out: Congressional Power over Individuals Under
the Indian Commerce Clause, 102 VA. L. REV. 1589 (2016) (criticizing the new
regulations (80 Fed. Reg. 10146 (2015)) issued pursuant to the Indian Child
Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1901-1963, and arguing that the power of Congress to
include as Indians non-enrolled persons living outside Indian Country and having
no tied to any tribal community is limited and may amount to racial
classifications).
141

THE
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For the purpose of this article, it is clear that it does extend to
regulation of criminal activities within Indian Country.147
Although I stated earlier that the Mancari’s Court sentence, to the
effect that as long as the special treatment of Indians could be tied
to Congress unique obligations towards Indians, such legislation
would not be disturbed,148 is better understood as enumerating one
way a statute concerning Indians can meet rational basis review,
there is an alternative way to understand that sentence. I have
argued elsewhere that cases like Mancari demonstrate that the
Court has integrated the trust doctrine into the Constitution.149 In
other words, the Court used the trust doctrine to expand
Congress’s power over Indian affairs beyond its normal Indian
Commerce Clause boundaries. The expansion, however, is not
infinite. The legislation has to be rationally tied to Congress’s
unique trust obligations towards the Tribes. My argument flowed
from the language the Court used in Mancari where after first
stating that “the plenary power of Congress to deal with the special
problems of Indians is drawn both explicitly and implicitly from
the Constitution itself,” the Court identified only the Indian
Commerce power and the various treaties signed with Indian
nations as the formal sources of this plenary power.150 However,
the Court quoted from a previous case for the proposition that
because the United States through wars “overcame the Indians
and took possession of their lands,” leaving them “helpless and in
need of protection. . . . Of necessity, the United States assumed the
duty of furnishing that protection, and with it the authority to do
all that was required to perform that [protection].”151
One could ask: what if a law, enacted pursuant to the Indian
Commerce Clause, discriminated more blatantly against Indians,
such as the laws that used to forbid Indians from possessing liquor
on Indian reservations?152 I have elsewhere taken the position that
such law would still not be considered racial classifications

See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646–48 (1977).
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974).
149 See Alex T. Skibine, Integrating the Indian Trust Doctrine into the
Constitution, 39 TULSA L. REV. 247, 247 (2003–04).
150 Morton, 417 U.S. at 551–52.
151 Id. at 552 (quoting Board of County Commissioners v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705,
715 (1943)).
152 For a comprehensive history of the federal alcohol laws related to Indians,
see Robert J. Miller and Maril Hazlett, The ‘Drunken Indian:’ Myth Distilled into
Reality Through Federal Alcohol Policy, 28 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 229 (1996).
147
148
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demanding strict scrutiny.153 Such law, however, should be
stricken under rational basis review, or a special version of
rational basis review some have called “rational basis with bite.”154
This enhanced rational basis review would be available if the
classification was made out of animus towards the group or if the
statute was aimed at impairing or denying important liberty
interests to members of a disfavored group lacking political clout.
As I explained, the three major differences between the enhanced
version and regular rational basis review is that under enhanced
review, courts will: (1) determine the real purpose behind the law,
(2) look more closely at whether the claimed governmental interest
is legitimate, and (3) Evaluate the court’s record to determine if
the means chosen are rationally related to achieving the real
purpose behind the legislation.
Because Mancari can be understood as using the trust doctrine
to either expand the Indian commerce power beyond regular
“commerce” or uphold the different treatment of Indians under
rational basis review, in the next section, I discuss what type of
legislation can in fact be considered as having been enacted
pursuant to Congress unique obligations towards the Indians.
2. Defining the Extent of Congress’s Unique
Obligations towards the Indians under the Indian Trust
Doctrine
One could criticize the reliance on the Indian Trust Doctrine as
a source of congressional power that is too vague.155 In other
words, how can one know whether a statute was enacted for the
benefit of Indians pursuant to Congress’s trust obligations? One
of the ambivalences concerning the trust doctrine is that there are
two versions of it. According to Professor Mary Wood, the first
version which she named the “sovereign trust doctrine,”156
originated with Justice Marshall’s opinion in Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia,157 where he described Indian nations as “domestic
dependent nations” and went on to say that the relationship

153 See Alex T. Skibine, Using the New Equal Protection to Challenge Federal
Control over Tribal Lands, 36 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 3, 29 (2015).
154 See id. at 50–51
155 See id. at 36–37.
156 See Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native
Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1548 (1994).
157 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 15 (1831).
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between the United States and these dependent nations resembled
that of a guardian to its ward.158 Professor Wood has called this
version the “sovereign trust,” because its main purpose was for the
trustee, the United States, to protect the continued existence of the
beneficiaries, the Indian nations, as self-governing sovereign
entities.
Unfortunately, the second iteration of the doctrine which
Professor Wood named the “guardian-ward” version, was not as
charitable to Indian nations. It was developed during what is
referred to as the Allotment Era,159 and its main purpose was to
grant plenary authority to Congress not only over Indian Affairs
but also over all the internal affairs of the tribes and their
members.160 As the Court famously stated in United States v.
Kagama, “[t]hese Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They
are communities dependent on the United States. From their very
weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing
of the Federal Government. . . . there arises the duty of protection,
and with it the power.”161 One of the many racist overtones of this
version of the doctrine was that individual Indians were
considered to be “wards” of the federal government because it was
thought that they were too incompetent to manage their own
personal affairs.162 So from a doctrine aimed at preserving Indian
nations as self-governing entities, the doctrine was transformed as
a tool to give Congress plenary authority over Indian people so they
could be more easily assimilated into the dominant society.163
Eventually, the Allotment Policy was repudiated in the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934,164 the plenary power of Congress over
Indian tribes is no longer considered absolute power,165 and the
United States has, since the late 1960’s, adopted a policy of
Id. at 17.
See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1, 10
(1995) (the allotment era took place between 1871 and 1928. Its main purpose
was to break up the tribal land base by allotting tribal lands within Indian
reservations and assign them to individual Indians so that they could become
farmers and more ready to assimilate with the dominant culture).
160 Id. at 9 (in other words, the purpose was to extend the power of Congress
beyond what was then considered to be the limit of the Indian Commerce power).
161 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383–84 (1886).
162 For a recent article describing the racist roots of this second version of the
doctrine, see Mary K. Nagle, Nothing to Trust: The Unconstitutional Origins of
the Post-Dawes Act Trust Doctrine, 48 TULSA L. REV. 63 (2012).
163 See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913).
164 48 Stat. 984–88 (1934) (codified as amended 25 U.S.C. § 461 et. seq.).
165 See Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977) (citing
United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 54 (1946)).
158
159
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encouraging self-determination for Indian nations166
as
exemplified by a 2011 Supreme Court case;167 however, the trust
doctrine today is still very much a mixture of these two earlier
versions. As such, it has been criticized by some scholars.168
Scholars who have favored the continued reliance on the trust
doctrine have attempted to delimit its contours in an attempt to
more precisely define Congress’s unique obligations towards the
Indians. Reid Chambers, for instance, has argued that the trust
doctrine should be viewed primarily as a doctrine to protect and
encourage tribal self-government.169 Professor Mary Wood has
argued that the purpose of the trust doctrine should be to protect
the attributes of tribal sovereignty which she claims at a minimum
include: 1. A stable and separate land base, 2. A viable tribal
economy, 3. Tribal self-government, and 4. Indian Cultural
vitality.170
In a 1980 case the Supreme Court carved some limits on the
power of Congress to invoke the trust doctrine as a source of
plenary authority that could be used to get around otherwise
applicable constitutional limits.
In United States v. Sioux
Nation,171 The Court held that because the taking of the Black Hills
from the Sioux Nation in South Dakota by the federal government
was not made pursuant to the trust responsibility, the Sioux were
owed just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.172 The Court
166 See FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 97, 102 (1942) (the
policy of Indian self-determination started to take shape in the early 1960’s).
167 United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2323–24 (2011)
(holding that the United States was not analogous to a regular trustee with
fiduciary duties defined by the common law of trust because the trust function
performed by the United States for Indian tribes was a sovereign function subject
to the plenary power of Congress).
168 See Kevin Gover, An Indian Trust for the Twenty-First Century, 46 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 317, 318 (2006); Stacey Leeds, Moving Toward Exclusive Tribal
Autonomy over Lands and Natural Resources, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 439, 441
(2006).
169 Reid P. Chambers, Compatibility of the Federal Trust Responsibility with
Self-Determination of Indian Tribes: Reflections on Development of the Federal
Trust Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. 1,
20 (2005).
170 See Mary C. Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A New
Trust Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995
UTAH L. REV. 109 (1995); See also Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native
Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1473–74
(1994).
171 United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 371 (1980).
172 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation”); Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. at 407–08 (1980).
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stated “the question whether a particular measure was
appropriate for protecting and advancing the tribe’s interests, and
therefore not subject to the constitutional command of the Just
Compensation Clause, is factual in nature. The answer must be
based on a consideration of all the evidence presented.”173
III. WHEN IT COMES TO FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS AFFECTING
INDIAN COUNTRY, SHOULD THE TERM “INDIAN” BE LIMITED TO
PEOPLE OFFICIALLY ENROLLED WITH INDIAN NATIONS?
A. Determining Whether the Definition of Indian for the
Purpose of Federal Criminal Statutes is a Racial or Political
Classification
In challenging the classification of “Indian” in the four federal
statutes at issue here, a defendant would have to allege that he is
being exposed to different rules than others because of his race or
the race of his victim and therefore, strict scrutiny should be
applicable. Using the test described in Part II, whether treating
“Indians” differently amounts to a racial classification would
depend on whether these statutes were enacted pursuant to the
Indian Commerce clause. If they were, there are no racial
classifications involved and rational basis, rather than strict
scrutiny, applies.
The first versions of the Indian Country Crimes Act, which came
into its final form in 1854, were contained in the early Indian
Trade and Intercourse Acts, the first version of which was enacted
in 1790.174 Many of the Acts’ criminal provisions were attempts to
codify provisions contained in treaties signed with the Indian
nations, dealing with the punishment of interracial crimes
committed in the Indian Country.175 As such, the ICCA is
rationally related to the trust responsibility since it is an
enforcement of the treaty obligations the United States has
towards the Indian nations. To the extent the ICCA enforces
crimes committed between Indian and non-Indians, it deals with
relations between reservation Indians and outsiders and is,
therefore, also within the Indian Commerce Clause even if one
takes the position that such clause does not give Congress the
Id. at 415.
Act of July 22, 1790, 1 Stat 137.
175 See Robert N. Clinton, Development of Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian
Lands: The Historical Perspective, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 951, 958–62 (1975).
173
174
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power to regulate the internal affairs of the tribes.176
The Major Crimes Act (MCA) presents more problems because
the Court originally took the position that it could not have been
enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause and used the
trust doctrine to uphold its legitimacy.177 Today, while the power
of the Federal government to enact federal criminal laws under the
interstate Commerce Clause may be successfully challenged,178 its
power to do so under the Indian Commerce Clause seems,
unfortunately, beyond doubt. As the Court stated “If anything, the
Indian Commerce Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of power
from the States to the Federal Government than does the
Interstate Commerce Clause.”179 Noted scholars have, however,
challenged the existence of a general federal police power over
Indian tribes as a matter of original intent or textual analysis of
the Constitution.180 I agree with their arguments. Therefore,
prosecutions undertaken under the Major Crimes Act for a crime
committed by a tribal member against a member of the same tribe
may not involve the Indian commerce power. Under the thesis
proposed in this article, if sections of the Major Crimes Act are
beyond the power of Congress under the Indian Commerce Clause,
the different treatment of Indians under these sections would
amount to a racial classification and would be evaluated under
strict scrutiny. While the United States may have many
compelling interests in implementing such legislation, enforcing
the trust responsibility should not be considered one of them.
Many scholars and commentators have argued that the Major
Crimes Act was not enacted pursuant to the modern version of the
trust doctrine.181 In other words, it was not done to protect the
attributes of tribal sovereignty.182 In effect, quite the contrary. As
Professor Kevin Washburn once observed:
[T]he Major Crimes Act was a monumental
See supra, notes 131–32.
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 380 (1886).
178 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
179 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 62 (1996).
180 See Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV.
31, 55–57 (1996); Clinton, supra note 138, at 115–16.
181 See Troy A. Eid & Carrie Covington Doyle, Separate but Unequal: The
Federal Criminal Justice System in Indian Country, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1067,
1071 (2010).
182 See Wood, The Trust Doctrine Revisited, supra note 170, at 1476.
176
177
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encroachment on the sovereign powers of Indian
tribal governments and a tremendous expansion of
federal authority over Indian tribes and Indian
people. At the time, official federal policy was to
destroy tribal governments and encourage
assimilation of individual Indians into the larger
society.183
Obviously, the MCA is not rationally related to the trust
obligations that the United States has towards Indian nations.
There are no similar problems with the Duro Fix or the Indian
VAWA Amendments, since both statutes reaffirmed the tribes’
inherent sovereignty to prosecute non-member Indians and nonIndians.184 The two statutes are clearly within the bounds of the
Indian Commerce Clause as they regulate the relations between
the tribes and non-members. In addition, they are consistent with
the trust doctrine as they were enacted to protect tribal selfgovernment. It is noteworthy that the Duro Fix was challenged on
equal protection grounds in two Circuit Court of Appeals cases.185
Both cases upheld the Duro Fix against these equal protection
attacks,186 but since both involved Indians who were bona fide
members of other federally recognized Indian tribes, they are not
relevant to the central issue discussed in this Article which is
whether recognizing as “Indians” persons of Indian ancestry who
are not members of any federally recognized Indian tribe creates a
racial classification.
A Due Process/Equal Protection argument was recently invoked
on behalf of such a group by Judge Robert Jones in Las Vegas Tribe
of Paiute Indians v. Phebus.187 At issue in the case was whether
the Las Vegas Paiute Tribe had jurisdiction, pursuant to the Durofix, to prosecute Phebus after the Tribe had just disenrolled him.
The tribal court held that Tribal jurisdiction was limited to Indians
who were enrolled tribal members in a federally recognized tribe.
Therefore, the Las Vegas Paiute Tribe did not have criminal
jurisdiction over Phebus since he was no longer enrolled with any
See Washburn, supra note 21, at 783.
25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012), 25 U.S.C. 1304 (2012).
185 See Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2005); Morris v.
Tanner, 160 F. App’x 600, 601–02 (9th Cir, 2005) (affirming Morris v. Tanner, 288
F. Supp. 2d 1133 (D. Mont. 2003).
186 Means, 432 F.3d at 937; Morris, 160 F. App’x at 601–02.
187 Las Vegas Tribe of Pauite Indians v. Phebus, 5 F. Supp. 3d 1221, 1231 (D.
Nev. 2014).
183
184
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Indian tribe. After the tribal court decision came down, the Tribe
sued Phebus in Federal Court seeking a declaratory judgment that
it still had criminal jurisdiction over him because even though
Phebus was no longer an enrolled tribal member, he could still be
an “Indian” for the purpose of the Duro Fix since that statute
adopted the definition of Indian used under the Indian Major
Crimes Act.188
The Federal District Court disagreed with both the tribal court
and the Tribe. It held that while tribal jurisdiction was not limited
to enrolled tribal members, this Tribe could only prosecute Phebus
if, under the second prong of the Bruce test, it could establish that
Phebus was recognized as an Indian by a tribe other than the one
that had just disenrolled him.189 The reasoning of the Judge as to
why he reached that conclusion is far from pellucid. The Court
first mentioned that the Supreme Court case which upheld the
constitutionality of the Duro Fix never reached the merits of the
Due Process and Equal Protection claim but only held that under
its plenary power over Indian Affairs, Congress could affirm and
recognize the inherent power of Indian tribes to prosecute nonmember Indians.190 Secondly, the court interpreted a Ninth
Circuit precedent, Means v. Navajo Nation,191 to have taken the
position that tribal prosecutions of non-member Indians under the
Duro Fix were not in violation of the Equal Protection and Due
Process clauses as long as the non-member Indian defendant was
in fact an enrolled or de facto member of another tribe.192 It is true
that the Means Court saw potentially some serious Equal
Protection issues with including non-enrolled Indians as Indians
for the purpose of the Duro Fix. However, since petitioner Russell
Means was in fact an enrolled member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe,
it concluded “We therefore can and do leave for another day the
challenging question Bruce invites: whether a person who was
racially Indian, but who was not enrolled or eligible for enrollment
in any tribe, would be subject to tribal court jurisdiction.”193
The Phebus court went on to conclude that it had “no problem
25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012).
Phebus, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 1237 (the court also ruled that the issue of whether
a defendant being tribally prosecuted under the Duro Fix is in fact an Indian
under the Bruce test should have been submitted to the jury).
190 Id. at 1231–32, (discussing United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 209–10
(2014)).
191 Means, 432 F.3d at 929.
192 Id. at 933.
193 Id. at 934–35.
188
189

2017]

INDIANS, RACE, AND CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

81

ruling that equal protection principles prevent a tribe’s
prosecution of a non-member whose only putative tribal affiliation
is with the prosecuting tribe itself and where that tribe has in fact
rejected or revoked the person’s membership.”194 Attempting to
explain why he had “no problem” with this conclusion, the judge
just stated “Under such circumstances, the political distinction
that may be permissibly drawn between non-member Indians and
non-Indians has been pulled away, leaving behind a purely racial
distinction between Indians and non-Indians, which is a
constitutionally impermissible basis for unequal treatment under
the law.”195
It is far from clear why a tribal prosecution of a disenrolled
former member amounts to a racial classification in violation of the
Equal Protection clause, while a tribal prosecution of another
person who is not enrolled with any tribe (but was never
disenrolled by the prosecuting tribe) and otherwise meets the
Bruce two prong test, should be considered a political
classification. It may very well be that the Judge just felt that a
person who had just been disenrolled by the prosecuting tribe could
not get a fair trial in that tribal court system. In other words, the
holding seems to have more to do with due process and
fundamental fairness than denial of equal protection based on
race.
In conclusion, because it is clear that under the thesis proposed
in this article, the ICCA, the Duro fix, the Indian VAWA
Amendments, and unfortunately also the current doctrine, the
MCA, were all enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce power,
they cannot be considered “racial” classifications under the theory
presented in this article. As such, the strict scrutiny test is not
applicable. If the classification at issue here, unenrolled persons
of Indian ancestry, was challenged under the rational basis test,
that group would have to show the following: First, that it is being
treated differently than similarly situated individuals. Secondly,
that the government does not have a legitimate interest in treating
the group differently, or that treating the group differently is not
rationally related to the accomplishment of the government’s
legitimate goal, purpose, or interest. Here, the government’s
interests, whether it is implementing treaty provisions as in the
ICCA, maintaining law and order on Indian reservations as with

194
195

Phebus, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 1232.
Id.
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the MCA, or protecting tribal sovereignty as with the Duro Fix, are
all legitimate.
The only remaining question is whether including as “Indians”
non-enrolled people of Indian ancestry who have some political or
social affiliation with a tribe is rationally related to the
governmental interests of promoting law and order or tribal selfgovernment on Indian reservations. Making additional people
subject to federal or tribal criminal jurisdiction can only bolster
law and order or tribal sovereignty. Because the Bruce/Rogers test
demands significant political or social affiliation with tribal
communities, there does not appear to be anything arbitrary or
irrational in including such people of Indian ancestry under the
definition of “Indian” for the purpose of federal or tribal criminal
jurisdiction in Indian Country.
A similar issue involving the Equal Protection clause arose in
a case challenging the power of an executive agency, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA), to deny Native Hawaiians the right to
petition for federal acknowledgment as an Indian tribe under rules
established by the agency.196 The Native Hawaiian plaintiffs
argued that the BIA regulation denying them the right to petition,
and thereby treating them differently than any other nonHawaiian indigenous group within the United States, amounted to
racial discrimination and should therefore be reviewed under strict
scrutiny. The Ninth Circuit disagreed. After distinguishing Rice
v. Cayetano,197 which had held that a law giving voting preference
to Native Hawaiians amounted to racial discrimination under the
15th Amendment to the United States Constitution,198 the Ninth
Circuit held that refusing to allow native Hawaiian groups the
right to petition for federal recognition as an Indian tribe did not
amount to racial discrimination because “the recognition of Indian
tribes remains a political, rather than racial determination.
Recognition of political entities, unlike classifications made on the
basis of race or national origin are not subject to heightened
scrutiny.”199 Using the lesser standard of judicial review, the court
held that “the unique history of Hawaii provide sufficient basis to
sustain the regulation against an equal protection challenge under
the highly deferential rational basis review.”200
196
197
198
199
200

Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, 386 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 2004).
Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
Id. at 542.
Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, 386 F.3d 1271, 1279 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1280.
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It has to be remembered that historically, Congress has been
given a lot of leeway to determine who qualifies as an Indian and
what groups qualify as Indian tribes for the purpose of the Indian
Commerce Clause. The question was debated at length by the
Court in United States v. Sandoval.201 The issue in Sandoval was
whether Congress had the power to enact laws restricting the
liquor trade inside the lands of the Pueblos in New Mexico.202
Whether the power existed depended on whether the Pueblos were
“Indians” and constituted Indian tribes for the purpose of the
Indian Commerce clause since that is the constitutional clause
giving Congress the power to enact such laws. In ruling that it was
up to Congress to determine whether the Pueblos were Indians and
constituted Indian tribes, the Court stated:
Of course, it is not meant by this that Congress may
bring a community or body of people within the
range of this power by arbitrarily calling them an
Indian tribe, but only in respect of distinctly Indian
communities the questions whether, to what extent,
and for what time they shall be recognized and dealt
with as dependent tribes requiring the guardianship
and protection of the United States are to be
determined by Congress, and not by the courts.203
For the Sandoval court, determining what groups qualified as
tribes was intrinsically related to who qualified as an “Indian.”
Without any “Indian” to speak of, no group could qualify as an
“Indian” tribe.204 Sandoval came down just a few years after
Montoya v. United States, where the Court had stated “By a ‘tribe’
we understand a body of Indians of the same or a similar race,
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 38 (1913).
See Gerald Torres, Who is an Indian? The Story of United States v.
Sandoval, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 109–45 (Kevin K. Washburn et al. eds., 2011)
(for a comprehensive analysis of the background and issues presented in the case).
203 Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 46.
204 As insightfully noted by Professor Gerald Torres, the “fundamental error”
in both the lower court’s opinion in Sandoval as well as in the Supreme Court is
that the opinions focused wrongly on whether the Pueblo people were racially
“Indian” instead of focusing on whether the Pueblos were a nation. Torres, supra
note 6, at 132. As stated by Professor Torres, “The racialist thinking that
percolates through this opinion (and through the Supreme Court’s later opinion
as well) is that the racial condition of the Pueblos is what determines their legal
status.” Id.
201
202
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united in a community under one leadership or government, and
inhabiting a particular through sometimes ill-defined territory.”205
B. The Policy Perspective:
The previous section has shown that there is very little
likelihood that expanding the universe of “Indians” beyond formal
tribal enrollment would be struck as unconstitutional. The
question explored in this section is whether there are any policy
reasons to restrict the definition of Indian to people who are
enrolled in federally recognized Indian tribes.
Concerning the definition of “Indian” for the purposes of federal
jurisdiction, in the first case to come with a multi factor test to
determine whether someone met the second prong of the Rogers
test, the court mentioned that:
Congress enacted [these] federal criminal statutes
in pursuance of the federal trust relationship to
fulfill three purposes: to prevent lawlessness in
Indian country, to fill gaps in criminal jurisdiction,
and to shelter Native Americans from the possible
biases of local courts. A broad construction of
“Indian” to extend federal criminal jurisdiction in
Indian country benefits Native Americans by
advancing these three goals.206
Yet, as discussed earlier, many pro-tribal scholars do not share
the opinion that the Indian Major Crimes Act was enacted for the
benefit of the Indians.207
It is true that from a law enforcement perspective, as one
commentator argued, a broad definition of Indian would allow the
federal government to crack down more efficiently on criminals. 208
Because of prosecutorial discretion, if a perpetrator can escape
federal jurisdiction by showing he is not an Indian, states may
decide not to prosecute him. As recently stated by the Supreme
Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901).
St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1462 (1988).
207 See discussion supra p. 29 & notes 180–183.
208 See Brian L. Lewis, Do You Know What You Are? You Are What You Is; You
Is What You Am; Indian Status for the Purpose of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction
and the Current Split in the Courts of Appeals, 26 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHIC JUST.
241, 284 (2010).
205
206
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Court “Even when capable of exercising jurisdiction, however,
States have not devoted their limited criminal justice resources to
crimes committed in Indian country.”209 On the other hand, from
a practical perspective, as another commentator noted, the bright
line approach of only relying on formal membership rolls has its
advantage.210 First, it would prevent the incongruous situation of
having federal courts and mostly non-Indian juries decide who is
an Indian.211 Also, alleged criminal defendants would not be able
to use their status as Indian or not as a matter of legal strategy to
dismiss a prosecution.212 Third, it would remove any doubts
concerning the constitutionality of the classification since the term
Indian would be limited to tribally enrolled Indians.213 In addition,
as stated by Judge Ikuta in her Zepeda concurrence, “In holding
that a person is not an Indian unless a federal court has
determined that the person has an acceptable Indian ‘blood
quantum,’ we disrespect the tribe’s sovereignty by refusing to defer
to the tribe’s own determination of its membership rolls.”214
Finally, limiting the term to enrolled Indians would get rid of the
inconsistencies among the various cases, as well as between the
circuits, 215 and also the inherently unpredictable jury
determinations on that issue
From a tribal perspective, it would be difficult to argue for a
narrow definition of Indians under the MCA and ICCA without a
corresponding transfer of jurisdiction to the tribes because under
current law, just diminishing the jurisdiction of the federal
government without more would not mean a corresponding
increase in tribal jurisdiction, but an increase in state
jurisdiction.216 In addition, because the Duro fix and the VAWA
Amendments adopted the same definition of “Indian” as the Major
Crimes Act, tribal prosecutors will probably want a broad
definition of “Indian” for all three statutes. At least one scholar
has argued, however, that the definition of “Indian” is flexible
enough that it could be given a different interpretation for the
United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1960 (2016).
See Katharine C. Oakley, Defining Indian Status for the Purpose of Federal
Criminal Jurisdiction, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 177, 206–07 (2011).
211 Id.
212 Id. at 207.
213 Id. at 207–08.
214 United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103, 1119 (9th Cir. 2015).
215 See Lindsey Trainor Golden, Embracing Tribal Sovereignty to Eliminate
Criminal Jurisdiction Chaos, 45 U. MICH. J. OF L. REFORM 1039, 1062–63 (2012).
216 See discussion supra notes 31–39.
209
210
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purposes of the Duro fix and the Major Crimes Act, 217 and that
tribes should be free to come up with their own definition of
“Indian” for the purposes of the Duro fix. While I agree that giving
different meanings to the term “Indian” for the purpose of each
statute would make a lot of sense from a policy perspective, I have
some doubts that courts would find the actual working of the Duro
fix flexible enough to allow for that possibility. 218
In the end, whether Indian tribes should care whether alleged
criminals of Indian ancestry who are not enrolled tribal members
are prosecuted by the states instead of by the federal government
or the tribes is a policy question which should be determined by
each tribe. This Article takes the position that federal criminal
jurisdiction over “Indians” should be limited to enrolled tribal
members unless the tribe on whose land the crime was committed
has come up with precise standards letting federal judges and
juries know who else qualifies as an Indian for the purposes of
federal criminal jurisdiction.219
CONCLUSION
In summary, this article has argued that, with the possible
exception of the Indian Major Crimes Act, the classification of
“Indian” for the purposes of the ICCA and the Duro fix is not
“racial” even if it includes non-enrolled people of Indian ancestry
with significant connections to tribal communities. Furthermore,
the holding of the Zepeda court, that the first prong of the Rogers
test could be satisfied by proof of blood quantum from any Indian
tribe, recognized or not, is highly suspicious, seems to be arbitrary,
and boosts the argument that the classification of “Indian” in such
cases is a racial classification. The conundrum, evident in Zepeda,
about what type of blood qualifies as Indian blood reinforces the
argument that the first prong of the Rogers test should be
eliminated, if not because of constitutional grounds, at least for
217 See Addie C. Rolnick, Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction Beyond Citizenship and
Blood, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 337, 398 (“It is odd to assume that the limits on
federal jurisdiction must match the limits on tribal jurisdiction, as the two
systems have very different purposes and histories.”).
218 See, for instance, In Re Gervais, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1224–25 (2004)
(finding, over tribal objections to the contrary, that the tribe had no criminal
jurisdiction over the petitioner because he was not an “Indian” for the purposes
of the Duro-fix).
219 See Rolnick, supra note 217, at 398–403 (describing current tribal practices
and codes defining who is an Indian for purposes of tribal jurisdiction).
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policy reasons.
In a report highly critical of law and order on Indian
reservations, the Indian Law and Order Commission,
recommended among other things, that:
[A]ny Tribe that so chooses can opt out immediately,
fully or partially, of Federal Indian country criminal
jurisdiction and/or congressionally authorized State
jurisdiction, except for Federal laws of general
application. Upon a Tribe’s exercise of opting out,
Congress would immediately recognize the Tribe’s
inherent criminal jurisdiction over all persons
within the exterior boundaries of the Tribe’s
lands . . . 220
The Report in effect argued in favor of a transfer of federal and
state jurisdiction to the tribes. That conclusion had also been
endorsed
by
various
scholars
and
commentators.221
Acknowledging the problems plaguing current law enforcement on
Indian reservations, this article has argued that the universe of
“Indians” for the purpose of federal jurisdiction should be limited
to enrolled tribal members unless the relevant tribe has enacted
precise standards delineating who is an Indian for the purpose of
federal and tribal jurisdiction on its reservation.

220 Indian Law & Order Comm’n, A Roadmap for Making Native America
Safer, Report to the President & Congress of the United States (November 2013),
https://perma.cc/67R7-ABER.
221 See generally Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal SelfDetermination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 854–55 (2006); Lindsey Trainor Golden,
Embracing Tribal Sovereignty to Eliminate Criminal Jurisdiction Chaos, 45 U.
MICH. J. OF L. REFORM 1039, 1069 (2012).

